Opening Access to Research by Armstrong, Mark
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Opening Access to Research
Mark Armstrong
Department of Economics, University of Oxford
April 2014
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/55488/
MPRA Paper No. 55488, posted 27. April 2014 01:21 UTC
Opening Access to Research
Mark Armstrong
April 2014
Abstract
Traditionally, the scholarly journal market operates so that research institutions
are charged high prices and the wider public is often excluded altogether, while
authors can usually publish for free and commercial publishers enjoy high prots.
Two forms of open access regulation can mitigate these problems: (i) direct price
regulation of the form whereby a journal must charge a price of zero to all readers,
or (ii) mandating authors or publishers to make freely available an inferior substitute
to the published paper. The former policy is likely to result in authors paying to
publish, which may lead to a reduction in the quantity of published papers and may
make authors less willing to publish in selective journals. Recent UK policy towards
open access is discussed.
Keywords: publishing, journals, open access, two-sided markets, regulation.
To open a book brings prot Chinese proverb
1 Introduction
Two related claims are often made about access to research: (a) many publishers charge
research institutions too much to subscribe to their journals, and (b) people should be able
to read research for free, especially when it has been publicly funded. The former reects
distributional concerns, in that high subscription charges have a welfare cost if a dollar
of library budget is worth more than a dollar of publisher prot, as is plausibly the case
when libraries are nanced out of public funds.1 The latter is an e¢ ciency point, since it is
Department of Economics, University of Oxford. I am very grateful to Doh-Shin Jeon, Alvin Klevorick,
Mark McCabe, Richard Price, Alan Sorensen, John Vickers, John Willinsky, and Jidong Zhou for helpful
comments. All views and errors are entirely my own.
1As House of Commons (2004, page 5) put it: There is mounting concern that the nancial benets
from the Governments substantial investment in research are being diverted to an excessive degree into
the pockets of publishers shareholders.
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ine¢ cient to exclude interested readers when it costs nothing extra to serve them. It may
also be costly in political terms to exclude readers, if those who ultimately pay for public
research are denied access to its nal product.
In broad terms, this paper argues that both concerns are valid and judicious policy
intervention in the journal market is worthwhile.2 One form of open access regulation
makes a journals content freely available to all at the time of publication, which is often
termed gold open access. Another kind of regulation focusses on authors rather than
publishers, and requires authors to post online their own version of the paper, a policy often
known as greenopen access. Yet another variant has the publisher make its content freely
available online but only after an embargo, sometimes known as delayedopen access.3
Green and delayed open access share the feature that an inferior version of the published
article is made freely available, which limits how much research institutions are willing to
pay for the journal itself and indirectly constrains the price that publishers can charge.
Like several other problematic markets, without regulation journal publishers often
exploit one group (in this case, their readers) in order to o¤er a generous deal to another (in
this case, authors, who usually can publish their work without charge).4 The journal market
is two-sided: authors provide content to interested readers, authors gain exposure and
citations by being read, and journals traditionally mediate much of the interaction between
the two sides.5 However, there is an important asymmetry between authors and readers,
2Scholarly books are di¤erent from journals in a number of respects. For instance, authors are paid
to publish (royalty rates of between ve and fteen percent are common), and so have more at stake in
making readers pay for access. Hard copy distribution is still dominant, and prices for books have not
risen nearly as fast as prices for journals. Policy-makers at present do not usually require open access for
scholarly books, although this may change as electronic dissemination of books becomes widespread.
3Willinsky (2006, Appendix A) lists ten kinds of open access, which includes situations where the print
edition of a journal is paid for while its online edition is free, or when the journal is available for free in
poorer countries. Another kind of open access policy would be to abolish copyright on scholarly works, a
policy discussed in detail by Shavell (2010). If copyright was abolished, authors and others would be free
to post the published version of the article online, and the e¤ect would be similar to the goldregime.
4Other markets with this feature include bank accounts (where a fraction of account holders pay high
penalty fees for overdrafts, say, which help to subsidise a free service for other customers), mobile telephony
(where subscribers have a subsidised handset, but those who call them are charged high prices), and search
engines (where people can search for free, but advertisers pay high prices to appear in their search results).
5For an overview of two-sided markets, see Rochet and Tirole (2006). An author who seems to have
actively disliked having an audience is Isaac Newton, who did not enjoy publishing in a journal (he did
so only once, in the rst scientic journal, the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society) because
of tedious follow-up correspondence with readers who disputed his ndings. See Willinsky (2006, chapter
13) for more details.
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which is that the peer-review process works to ensure that an article is only published in
a single journal and is strongly di¤erentiated from other published articles.6 (The peer-
review process also forces authors to cite relevant articles, which drives up demand for
access to published work.) Each published article thus constitutes a mini-monopoly, and a
journal enjoys a monopoly in providing access by readers to its articles.7 For this reason, a
journal is able to set high prices to readers which bear little relation to the cost of running a
journal, and to use some of the resulting prots to fund generous deals to attract authors.8
A quirk of the journal market is that publishers do not pay authors for their work. As
a result, the most generous deal a publisher can o¤er is that an author can publish for free,
so that authors enjoy open accessto the journals subscribers. Since authors cannot be
paid, the large revenues from selling subscriptions to institutions are not easily dissipated
and commercial publishers can enjoy super-normal prots. High subscription fees and
excess publisher prots are due mostly to the monopoly nature of each individual article,
not to some more aggregate measure of concentration in the journal market.9 (However,
having a portfolio of many journals may help a publisher obtain yet higher prots, due to
its ability to engage in bundling.) A model of the publishing market with these elements
is presented in section 5.1.
A gold open access regime, in which journals make their articles freely available at
the time of publication, overcomes the bottleneck problem (a) as well as the public access
problem (b). Gold open access is a form of price regulation for journals, regulation which
forces them to set a price of zero to readers. This policy, if widely implemented, would
6This asymmetry is masked in theoretical models with just a single journal. In the terminology of two-
sided markets, authors single-home, while readers must multi-home(i.e., subscribe to several journals)
if they wish to see a range of content.
7As it was put in the opening editorial to the open access journal PLOS Biology (Brown et al. (2003,
page 2)): each journal has a monopoly on a resource vital to scientiststhe unique collection of articles
it has published. Anyone who depends on the information in a specic article has no choice but to pay
whatever price the publisher asks.
8This pattern of cross-subsidy would be reversed in an alternative world in which readers each subscribed
to a single journal, and authors had to place their work in multiple journals in order to reach a large
readership. In that world, readers would be courted by journals, and authors pay high fees for access to
the captive readers. This alternative situation is akin to the newspaper market, where most people read a
single newspaper, and advertisers have to place adverts in multiple outlets to reach the desired number of
eyeballs.
9Dewatripont et al. (2006, Table 3) reports market shares in terms of citations received for the major
publishers. In a few subject areas (chemistry, engineering) there is signicant concentration, but otherwise
concentration does not seem extreme.
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hugely cut library expenditures in research institutions.10 Journals would then usually
have to cover their running costs by charging authors a fee to publish a paper.11 Like
more familiar one-sidedmarkets, journals would then compete for custom from authors
in terms of publication fee, quality of articles accepted, turnaround time, value-added from
the refereeing process, and so on, and there is a greater chance that only normal prots
would be observed.12
A partial (that is, a green or delayed) open access regime, which instead focusses
on making freely available an inferior version of the published article, partly overcomes
problems (a) and (b). That an inferior substitute is freely available implies that libraries
have a reasonable outside option, and publishers are forced to charge less if they wish to
continue selling their subscriptions. The wider public has free access to an inferior variant of
the published article, while before they may have been excluded altogether. Nevertheless,
publishers may still be able to extract su¢ cient revenue to cover their costs from libraries
willing to pay for the premium published version, albeit with less to spare, and so a partial
open access policy may be consistent with authors continuing to publish for free.
While a gold policy fully deals with problems (a) and (b), the fact that authors will
likely pay to publish introduces its own problems. First, paying to publish will deter some
authors at the margin from publishing at all, as illustrated in the model in section 5.1.
Even if many authors have access to funds to cover their publication fees, there will often be
10Association of Research Libraries (2006, Table 2) reports that the median library in the association
spent about $6 million on journal subscriptions in 2005.
11A surprisingly large number of journals currently have neither reader fees nor publication fees. (See
www.eigenfactor.org/openaccess for more details.) Presumably, these journals operate with funding from
institutions or charities, and/or by editors and reviewers donating their time. An extreme case is the old
Bell Journal of Economics, which between 1970 and 1981 o¤ered its content for free to anyone who asked
(and this was in the days before electronic dissemination, when there was a cost to supply a hard copy
to each reader) and paid its authors a substantial fee for publication. The journals funder, Bell Labs,
clearly felt it was worthwhile to spend money to attract good papers and to disseminate those papers to
the widest audience.
12As Brown et al. (2003, page 2) put it: Open access would eliminate monopolies over essential
published results, diminishing prot margins and creating a more e¢ cient market for scientic publishing.
There remains the danger that network e¤ects may lead to market power. (See the parable of the
anarchistsannual meetingin Bergstrom, 2001.) For instance, if many readers only look at a few journals
because they think all the good articles are published there, an author of a good paper must publish in
one of those journals if her article is to be noticed and such journals could charge high publication fees to
authors. Open access policy on its own can do little to overcome this coordination problem.
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an opportunity cost when paying to publish a paper.13 (Paying to publish an article might
mean the author can attend one less conference, say.) Of course, not publishing at all is
even more harmful to potential readers than paying a high price for access. Second, more
selective journals are likely charge higher author fees in the gold regime, since they follow a
more rigorous and costly peer-review process. (By contrast, in the traditional reader-pays
model, the extra costs of peer-review are covered by readers.) As such, authors may be less
willing to publish in selective journals, and the quality-certifying function of journals may
be reduced. A model of the publishing market with this avour is presented in section 5.2.
In the next section, I discuss the journal market in more detail. I discuss how modern
technology has reduced journal costs, and helped to boost revenue, so that publisher prots
have risen in recent years. I also discuss how the internet acts to disintermediate the
interaction between authors and readers. Authors can post their work online, which can
be freely accessed by readers using general search tools. Author reputations are increasingly
determined by citations rather than where they publish, and readers can use online metrics
(citations, downloads, and so on) to guide them to the most important research. As a result,
a journals traditional roles to disseminate and certify the importance of research are less
important now. Section 3 provides a brief history of open access in publishing, including
recent policy to widen access to scholarly work in the UK. Section 4 summarises the main
arguments concerning the various forms of policy intervention, and suggests that most of
the benets of open access can be obtained with a partial open access policy, without the
signicant disruption that the gold policy with expensive author fees is likely to cause.
2 Traditional Journals and their Alternatives
2.1 The purpose of a journal
Traditional journals provide a number of benets to their authors and readers, including:
(i) preparing the denitive typeset version of a paper and releasing citation details (e.g.,
page and volume numbers); (ii) certifying an articles quality via the journals reputation
13I will not be using my limited research funds to pay, say, £ 1,500 to make this article open access from
the publisher. Solomon and Björk (2012a, Tables 5 and 6) report that signicant number of authors do
pay publication fees out of their own pocket, especially when the fee is below $1000 and when the author
comes from a poorer country.
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for selectivity; (iii) improving the original manuscript by suggestions from reviewers and
editors, and (iv) distributing the published paper to those (and only those) permitted to
read it.14 In the modern era, some of these functions are freely available to all potential
readers, even in the traditional reader-pays model. Most importantly, there is open access
to information about which journal a paper appears in and the associated quality signal
via an authors CV, journal homepages and the like, even if the reader has no access to
the published paper itself.
Task (i) is useful for readers, and necessary for fellow researchers who need to cite the
paper accurately. In the era when authors prepared manuscripts on typewriters, typesetting
by publishers was a valuable improvement to the appearance of the paper, especially for
technical material. Nowadays, though, word processing software allows authors to prepare
clean copy on their own computer, including diagrams, tables and gures, and typesetting
by publishers provides less value-added. It remains useful, however, for a reader to know
she has the very nal version of a paper, especially if she wishes to discuss what that paper
does in her own writing.
Task (ii) is important to both authors and readers, although less so now than it used
to be. Historically, an author attempted to place her article in the most discriminating
journal willing to accept it. As a result, a journal provided a signal of the articles quality,
which is important for authors, who benet from being seen to be able to publish in a top
journal, and to potential readers who are guided to the work it is most worthwhile to read.
An authors inner circle of fellow researchers in her area will have an idea of her skills,
regardless of where her work appears. However, an author cares about her reputation more
widely than this. For instance, decisions about salary, tenure and job o¤ers are made by
people outside this inner circle, who will rely more on external signals such as where the
author has published. Many authors would happily pay a good deal of money to place an
article in a prestigious journal.
The journal in which a paper appears is also an important guide to potential readers.
Someone looking for useful papers to read cares about both horizontalattributes (that
is, how relevant the paper is to her interests) and verticalattributes (how innovative or
14This list is obviously a simplication. See scholarlykitchen.sspnet.org/2012/07/18/a-proposed-list-60-
things-journal-publishers-do (accessed 28 March 2014) for 60 things that journals do.
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insightful the paper is). A reader cannot judge how useful a paper actually is until she
reads it, i.e., a paper is an experience good. Given that reading a paper involves a sunk
cost, a reader benets from ex ante information about both the horizontal and vertical
attributes of a paper before deciding what to read. In the pre-internet era, searching for
useful papers was a time-consuming, hit-and-miss a¤air, and as a form of triage it was
e¢ cient for a busy researcher to conne her search to a small number of elite and specialist
journals. For this reason, being published in a prominent journal helped boost a papers
readership, even among those readers able to access most journals at their institution.
However, the internet changes much of this. The internet makes search on the horizon-
taldimension much less costly, and location of relevant work is superbly easy. This makes
the traditional role of a specialist journal, to gather together papers of relevance to those
working within that specialism for their ease of reference, almost vanish.15 The internet
also makes available additional cues about vertical aspects, that is, about a papers likely
quality. Data about the number of papers which cite a particular article are freely available
on scholarly search engines such as Google scholar, and these are arguably as good a sig-
nal of quality as the host journals reputation for selectivity once some time has passed.16
(After all, the decision to publish a paper in a journal is typically made by an editor and
couple of referees, while a well-cited paper usually has some kind of approval from many
readers.) Casual observation suggests that citation data from Google scholar increasingly
play a role in hiring and promotion decisions, and a well-cited paper in a mediocre journal
nowadays carries much weight in committee decisions.
Readers as well as employers can use citation data on the internet as a guide to likely
quality, and download data from subject repositories and other altmetricscan provide
additional cues. However, this observational learning where an agent chooses what ear-
lier agents have been seen to choose can easily lead to ine¢ cient herding. Just as people
15There may remain a modest supply-side rationale for a specialist journal in terms of having a homo-
geneous team of editors with similar interests.
16There has been citation data available long before Google scholar, for instance on Web of Science.
However, Google scholar has a number of advantages, including ease of use, the fact it includes working
papers and other non-journal material as well as published articles, and the fact that it is free. (Institutional
subscription costs for Web of Science are non-trivial. Cornell University reports it pays $155,000 per year
for access see John Bohannon, Google scholar wins ravesbut can it be trusted?, Science 343, page 14,
January 2014.)
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only reading novels on the best-seller list or diners choosing to eat in crowded restaurants
may lead to desirable options being ignored, so might easy access to citation and download
data lead to undue focus on a few articles lucky enough to gain early prominence.17
Of course, journals will continue to play some role in a papers impact. It may even
be that the choice of journal actually makes more di¤erence to a papers eventual success
than in the past. For instance, being published in a prestigious journal may generate more
early citations, and this early advantage is then amplied via observational learning. (This
issue is briey discussed in the model presented in section 5.2 below.)
A major development in journal publishing is the recent entry of so-called mega
journals (also known as repositoryjournals), mostly in the science area. These journals
have very broad scope in terms of subject matter, and have peer-review policies markedly
less stringent than the traditional selective journal. The rst and most successful of these
is PLOS ONE, whose editorial policy states: Too often a journals decision to publish a
paper is dominated by what the editor/s think is interesting and will gain greater readership
 both of which are subjective judgements and lead to decisions which are frustrating
and delay the publication of your work. PLOS ONE will rigorously peer-review your
submissions and publish all papers that are judged to be technically sound. Judgements
about the importance of any particular paper are then made after publication by the
readership (who are the most qualied to determine what is of interest to them).This
journal currently accepts about 70% of submissions, has a very respectable impact factor
of 3.73 for 2013, and in 2012 it published 23,464 articles, making it probably the largest
journal in the world.18
17Salganik, Dodds and Watts (2006) report the results of an experiment in the context of music (rather
than scholarly) consumption. Subjects arrived sequentially at a music website and were presented with a
list of previously unknown songs from unknown bands. Subjects could listen to any number of these songs,
and afterwards they could download any of them for later listening. Some subjects did not see download
data for songs, and had to decide what to listen to only on the basis of the song title and name of the band.
A songs share of downloads among these neutralsubjects is a natural measure of a songs quality. Other
subjects could see each songs download data, which they could use as a cue for likely quality Among these
subjects in the social inuencetreatment the distribution of download shares was more concentrated, so
that the most popular song was more popular relative to the neutral treatment. On average, song quality
was positively correlated with downloads in the social inuence treatment, although with much noise
(e.g., a high-quality song might not do well when downloads were reported).
18See www.plosone.org/static/information (accessed 26 February 2014). The journal reports download
statistics, reader comments, media coverage and social media sharesfor each of its articles, which help
to signal likely quality.
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Publishing in a mega-journal is a strategy intermediate between publishing in a tradi-
tional selective journal and just posting a working paper on the internet. Readers know
they have the denitive version of the paper, and with the modest degree of quality control
they can be fairly condent that there is nothing wrongwith the paper before they de-
cide whether to read it. Authors use the journal as a platform to publicise their work, and
hope that it gets taken up by the community of researchers. Mega-journals also provide ef-
ciency gains in terms of refereeing e¤ort. Since a reasonable paper is likely to be accepted
at such a journal, it will be refereed just once. Traditionally, by contrast, an author would
work her way through journals of decreasing prestige until one agreed to publish her paper,
generating a new set of referee comments at each stage.19 The fact that a paper is more
likely to be accepted also means that it is published more quickly than when the author
submits to several journals, which is obviously of benet to readers. In practice, mega-
journals are open access, though one can imagine a subscription journal having an editorial
policy similar to PLOS ONEs. A major reason for this is probably that mega-journals
are new journals, and most new journals have to be open access to succeed. (Because of
the tightness of library budgets, a librarys margin is usually to decide which journals to
cancel rather than which subscription journals to add.)
Some journals do not supply credible certication services at all. There is a market for
vanitypublishing, and many quasi-fraudulent journals will publish almost anything
including plagiarised or self-plagiarised work in return for a fee from the author. These
journals often market themselves as open access, although they have minimal readership
and could not generate much subscription revenue if they tried. Often these journals have
impressive names, perhaps similar to those of established, peer-reviewed, journals. Dishon-
est, desperate, or inexperienced authors are willing to pay to have a plausible publication
on their CV which would not get through a peer-review process.20 (The model in section
19The review process at a mega-journal is also likely to less onerous for referees than at a traditional
selective journal, since a referee is asked merely to judge correctness.
20See Beall (2012) for more details. (Beall currently maintains a list of dubious journals on his webpage.)
Bohannon (2013) reports the outcome of an interesting investigation. He concocted a awed paper about a
new cancer treatment, which he plausibly suggests would not be passed by a credible peer-review process,
sent the paper under a variety of assumed names to 304 open access journals. The paper was accepted by
157 (including journals published by Elsevier, Kluwer and Sage), rejected by 98, while the remaining 49
had not responded by the time the investigation went to press.
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5.2 describes an unregulated journal market which has reputable subscription journals and
worthless author-pays journals coexisting.)
Task (iii) is not unanimously viewed as a benet by either authors or readers. At least
in economics, the traditional revision process has become increasingly costly for authors,
both in terms of time and e¤ort see Ellison (2002). Several decades ago the typical
time from submission to acceptance was just a few months, and requests for substantive
revisions were rare. In 1999, though, the average time from submission to acceptance in
most top journals was two years, plus another wait for publication itself. (If the author has
to submit her paper to more than one journal, the overall delay stretches on further still.)
Alongside this, published papers have become longer, and now have lengthy introductions
and extra sections covering extensions to the basic model. Of course, an unduly lengthy
process of revisions is also costly for readers who want timely access to the latest research,
even if there is free and immediate access to the work when it is eventually published.
While the revision process sometimes improves a paper, especially one submitted from an
inexperienced author, a good case can be made that the process has got out of hand. The
mega-journals discussed above are a natural vehicle for authors who wish to publish in
outlets which allow them to present their work as they see t and without undue delay.21
Task (iv) is most directly relevant to the open access debate. Authors typically put a
lot of weight on the size and composition of their readership to generate career-enhancing
citations and generally increase their visibility and wish to publish in a journal which is
read by the desired audience. However, while they care about reaching their peers (who
are the only readers likely to generate citations), authors plausibly care less about reaching
the wider publicand would be unwilling to pay a substantial publication fee out of their
own pocket to do so.22
21The observation that authors are dissatised by a journals review policy sits awkwardly with the
perspective of the market taken in this paper, which is that journals pander to authorsinterests in order
to exploit readers. It may be that this slowdown is worst in the top journals, where authors are particularly
keen to place their work. Indeed, in economics at least, the pattern seems to be for most of the very top
journals to exploitauthors in terms of forcing an arduous review process and sell cheaply to libraries,
while less prestigious journals woo authors in order to exploit libraries. Many journals do attempt to
attract authors by reporting their turnaround statistics. For instance, many of Elseviers journals report
submission-to-accept times, as well as accept-to-publication times. (To illustrate, International Journal
of Industrial Organization reports that its average submission-to-accept time was 13.3 weeks in 2013, far
shorter than the delays at most top journals reported by Ellison.)
22House of Commons (2004, page 9) quotes the UKs Royal Society of Chemistry as saying most authors
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Nevertheless, there are benets to the wider public gaining timely access to scholarly
material.23 For example, a provincial lawyer might learn about relevant case law, journalists
might write better-informed articles, or history teachers in schools may give better classes.
Amateur astronomers benet from access to journals, and in turn contribute to science
themselves. Small-scale innovators nd it useful to consult scholarly material but cannot
a¤ord to pay much for it.24 Probably the scholarly topic of widest interest to the public is
health and medicine, and millions every day search online for information in this area.25
Not surprisingly, putting content behind a pay-wall does appear to make a signicant
di¤erence to readership (as proxied by the number of downloads), but less so for citations.
Davis (2011) secured the agreement of 36 reader-pay journals to select randomly about
one-quarter of their articles for open access treatment. He found that during the rst year
after publication, the open access articles were downloaded more (115% more for HTML
downloads and 62% more for pdf downloads) than their pay-to-access counterparts, and
accessed by 31% more unique visitors. However, he found no signicant di¤erence in
citation rates for the three years after publication for the two groups. He interprets these
results as consistent with readers of scholarly work falling into two groups: those who work
in research universities, who mainly provide citations and have access to most journals in
any event, and others who consume but do not contribute to the corpus.26
care where their work is seen and who it is seen by far more than they care about how many people have seen
it. In fact, though, journals are not always available in research libraries, let alone to the wider public.
Strieb and Blixrud (2013) report the take up of journals from selected publishers by research-intensive
libraries in North America. For example, while in 2012 almost all (96%) of these libraries subscribed to
some collection of Wiley journals, only 19% obtained its complete set. (The respective gures for Elsevier
are 92% and 23%.)
23See Willinsky (2006, chapter 8) and Suber (2012, section 5.5) for a more detailed discussion.
24Houghton et al. (2011) conducted interviews with 23 smaller research-oriented businesses in Denmark.
Some of these businesses subscribe to the most relevant journals, most regularly consult open access
material on the internet (in repositories or in open access journals), and some ask contacts in universities
to provide them with content. Most report di¢ culties gaining access to recent research.
25Some try to use public interest in heath as an argument against open access. House of Commons
(2004, page 25) quotes a representative of Wiley as saying this rather enticing statement that everybody
should be able to see everything could lead to chaos. Speak to people in the medical profession, and they
will say the last thing they want are people who may have illnesses reading this information, marching
into surgeries and asking things.
26There is a huge literature now looking at the interaction between ease of access and download/citation
rates see the long footnote 6 in Suber (2012, page 178). A problem throughout is how to isolate the e¤ect
of opening access per se on subsequent readership. For example, older studies found a huge impact on
citations from having an article in an open access journal or repository, but this might be due to authors
putting their best work in such journals. In the study cited, it is possible that readers mistakenly took the
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As with task (ii), task (iv) can often be bypassed by authors and readers by means
of the internet. An author can post (or self-archive) a version of her work on a public
website, such as her own webpage, her institutions or funding bodys repository, or a
subject-specic repository.27 Even if these various websites are not prominent themselves,
search tools such as Google scholar enable easy location of works by specic authors, titles
or topics. Di¤erent versions of a published paper which might be self-archived are the pre-
submitted (or working paper or preprint) version, the accepted (or postprint)
version which incorporates reviewer comments but which is still the authors own version
in terms of formatting, and the nal published version as typeset by the journal.
Of course, an author is always permitted to post a working paper on a webpage before
she submits to a journal. (Authors have copyright until they assign it to someone else.)
However, many prominent medical journals use the so-called Ingelnger Rule, and will
not consider a paper for publication if it has previously been posted (published) on the
internet, which severely deters preliminary circulation of papers.28 Unless the article is
published with open access (either in a full open access journal, or in a hybridjournal
which allows author to pay to make the paper open access), a publisher will rarely allow
an author to post its own version immediately on a public webpage. The intermediate
version the accepted author version can be self-archived under rules which vary widely
from publisher to publisher and over time. If the accepted version can be self-archived at
the same time as publication, the benets of task (iii) are also freely enjoyed by readers
and there is de facto open access for readers. A reader can check the likely quality of a
paper by discovering which journal it appears in and go on to read the near-identical free
version online, much as a consumer gets product advice in a bricks-and-mortar store and
then goes on to buy the product more cheaply online. In such cases, readers who choose to
pay for the published version do so in large part for the limited aesthetic benets of task
label open accessas a signal that such papers were particularly good (for instance, because only highly-
regarded scholars had research funds to pay for open access). In addition, it is possible that potential
readers of the non-open access articles went on to download a self-archived version from elsewhere, so that
total downloads from all sources were not so di¤erent for the two groups of article.
27In fact, some subject repositories do charge readers for access. In economics, this is currently the case
with NBER and CEPR working papers.
28Franz Ingelnger was the editor of the New England Journal of Medicine who formalised this policy
in 1969.
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(i) and the peace of mind that one is reading the very nal version of the paper.
Self-archiving can be done with or without permission from the journal. Indeed, au-
thors have an incentive to be carelessabout their copyright obligations, since they do
not receive the subscription income and illegal distribution may boost their visibility and
citations.29 Traditional subscription journals have an incentive to permit a degree of self-
archiving (or alternatively, to make their own content freely available after some delay),
partly because this helps to attract authors and partly because wider readership will boost
citations and impact factors, which in turn helps publishers market their journals to li-
braries. Conceivably, the authors version and the publishers version might even be com-
plements, if a reader samples the authors version for free and if she likes it she goes
on to buy the published version.30 Permitting a degree of self-archiving can be viewed as
a kind of price discrimination: those readers who particularly value the product pay for
the superior version, while other interested readers can obtain an inferior version for free
(which brings indirect benets to the publisher).31
2.2 The cost and revenue of a journal
The tasks described in section 2.1 cost money. Indeed, in the past even the most presti-
gious journals had di¢ culty making ends meet.32 Throughout much of the last century,
journals in scientic disciplines levied charges on both sides of the market to boost their
revenues.33 However, changes in technology mean that important aspects of costs have
29Many economists appear to post the published version of recently published papers on their own
webpage, in most cases in conict with the copyright agreement made with the publisher. Morris (2009)
reports that many authors do not have an accurate understanding of publisher rules about copyright:
authors often think they can post the published version on their webpage when they cannot, and many do
not think they can post the accepted version of their paper on a public website when they can.
30Finch et al. (2012, para. 7.67) reports evidence that providing access to articles via repositories with
high-quality metadata may lead to a marginal increase in downloads from the publishers site. Suber
(2012, section 5.3) discusses the complementarity between electronic and hard-copy book formats.
31For similar reasons, suppliers of music, movies or software may be prepared to tolerate a degree of
piracy. In markets with network e¤ects, for instance, allowing some piracy to occur causes a rm to expand
its base of users, which enables it to charge more to legitimate buyers. See Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006)
for a survey of this literature.
32Berg (1971, p. 799) writes that in the 1880s, university subsidies and voluntary labor were essential
to the nancial viability of the Quarterly Journal of Economics and the Journal of Political Economy.
33In the context of the model in section 5.1, this situation corresponds to the case where expression (2) is
not satised. Barton (1963) reports how the Physical Review had nancial di¢ culties in the 1920s. (Dues
and subscription rates had been increased, but this process could not be continued [...] without risking so
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fallen dramatically in recent years, while a journals ability to generate revenue has grown.
It is now essentially costless to distribute journal articles to additional readers over the
internet, while before publishers had to print and send hard copies. (Likewise, a librarys
storage costs for electronic journals is zero.) Electronic distribution is now the dominant
way for readers to access journal articles. Editorial software is nowadays cheaply or freely
available, which reduces the costs of managing the submission and peer-review process
(perhaps removing the need for a secretary and o¢ ce premises).34 Word processing software
means that most authors can prepare their own documents in a professional manner, which
could greatly reduce a journals own typesetting costs.
As discussed in section 1, the monopoly nature of each article enables a reader-funded
publisher to set high prices to readers which need not be related to underlying costs, and
this was true even before the internet. The gradual entry of commercial publishers into
the journal market during the second half of the last century has probably led to a greater
focus on prots, and less squeamishness in generating those prots.35 Since it costs nothing
to supply electronic journals to additional readers, a commercial publishers ideal outcome
in the internet age is to serve all readers and to fully extract each readers surplus from
its journals, the strategy known as rst degreeprice discrimination. Such a strategy not
only yields maximum revenue to the publisher from its readers, but achieves the maximum
audience for its authors.
While this outcome cannot be perfectly achieved, publishers can often get close. A
publisher can condition its subscription charge on the size and nature of the institution it
supplies or the wealth of the country.36 The move to electronic distribution means that a
publisher can monitor download activity, which helps it nely tune its prices to institutions
great a decline in members and subscribers that the total income would be reduced rather than raised.)
As a result, in 1930 the journal introduced an author per-page charge of $2. In subsequent decades, the
practice was followed by several other journals in physics, chemistry and biology.
34For instance, the licence for Editorial Express, journal management software used by many journals
in the social sciences, costs just $2000 per year. (See editorialexpress.com, visited 20 March 2014.)
35Dewatripont et al. (2006) document how journal prices were rising faster than book prices in the
pre-internet era, and argue this may be due to the increased share of journals owned by commercial
publishers.
36For instance, the University of Chicago Presss price list for its journals and collections of journals
conditions price on whether the institution is very large higher education, secondary school, museum,
corporate, and so on, where the highest price is about twice the lowest price for a given package. See
press.uchicago.edu (visited 20 March 2014).
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over time. It is now easier and cheaper for publishers to bundle their journals into a
collection which they sell as a package to libraries. For the same reason that a diversied
portfolio has a more predictable return to investors, a publisher is better able to predict a
librarys willingness-to-pay for a large collection of journals than for any individual title.
As such, a publisher with many journals is better able to extract a librarys surplus from
the collection without much risk of the library cancelling its subscription. The result of
all this price discrimination is that librariesbudgets are squeezed, but more journals are
available in libraries than ever before.37
One necessary input for a journal does not cost it anything, and that is the paper itself.
Since the birth of scientic publishing, the norm is not to pay authors for their articles,
although it is not clear from where this norm arises or why it persists. For example, it
would be feasible to pay an author each time their article is downloaded from the journal,
which is akin to royalty payments in the hard-copy world.38 (Perhaps if one journal breaks
rank and o¤ers to pay authors to publish, it would attract a disproportionate fraction
of duplicative work from authors submitting work with much overlap with their previous
work?) Because journals do not pay authors for their work, the revenues from selling
subscriptions to libraries are not passed back to authors but retained as super-normal
prots. Big commercial journal publishers are indeed highly protable. Reed-Elseviers
2013 Annual Report (page 12) shows that its scientic, technical and medicaldivision
made prot of £ 826m on revenues of £ 2126m, a margin of 39%.39
However, it is not only commercial publishers which benet from high prices to libraries,
but also learned societies and scholarly associations. Many such associations run journals
which are distributed by commercial publishers, and prots from selling subscriptions to
these journals are largely passed back to associations. These associations can use these
37Association of Research Libraries (2006, Graph 2) shows that in the period 1986-2004, their member
librariesexpenditure on journals rose by more than 300%, while the average number of journals available
in a library rose by 42%.
38Of course, this is not to say that authors are not nancially rewarded when they publish, only that the
payment does not come from the publisher. Shao and Shen (2011, Table 1) describe an incentive scheme
in China which pays authors according to an explicit scheme based on the impact factor of the journal.
(For instance, the lead author of a paper in Nature or Science would receive 200,000 RMB, the current
equivalent of about £ 20,000.) More common is an implicit incentive scheme, where scholars who publish
well get promoted or o¤ered better jobs.
39Page 14 of the Annual Report says there were about 700 million downloads in the year, so that the
average revenue per download was around £ 3.
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prots to fund conferences, scholarships, public awareness campaigns, and the like. (In
addition, several learned societies in the UK seem to be located in highly prestigious
premises in London.) To illustrate, in 2000 the American Astronomical Society obtained
around $4.8 million of its overall $8.7 million budget from the revenues of its three journals.
Because these associations depend so heavily on journal subscription income, many actively
lobby against open access regulations.40
A journals cost per article published will vary substantially, depending on how selective
the journal is and how much care it takes in making an article look nice. Some time ago,
House of Commons (2004, page 74) reported that Wiley suggested $1500 would be the
lowest cost per article, and its more selective journals would have higher costs than this.
Nature suggested that its cost per article was in the range $10,000 to $30,000 because of its
90% rejection rate.41 Author fees for gold open access provide some guide to presumably
an upper bound on the cost of publishing an article. Authors fees at the various PLOS
journals currently vary between $1350 for the PLOS ONE mega-journal and $2900 for the
highly selective PLOS Biology. Springer currently o¤ers to make an article open access in
its subscription journals for an author fee of $3000. Typically, publication fees for open
access in hybrid journals are higher than in full open access journals. The Wellcome Trust
released details of the publication fees it paid in the year 2012/13.42 It paid £ 3.9 million to
make 2126 articles (and one book) open access, which implies an average publication charge
of around £ 1800, and it reports that on average it paid higher fees to hybrid journals than
to pure open access journals. It is likely that the costs of running a pure open access journal
are lower than a subscription (or hybrid) journal. A publisher incurs selling costswhen
arranging contracts with readers, which it avoids when all its content is freely available.
(Publishers have a signicant sales force dedicated to negotiating contracts with libraries
and other readers, which could be dispensed with under open access.) In addition, when
40House of Commons (2004, page 13) quotes the British Pharmacological Society as saying in 2002-
03 we spent over £ 850,000 on promoting and advancing pharmacology. Nearly £ 800,000 came from our
publishing activities. With this income we should either have to raise funds in a di¤erent way or cease to
provide most of our current activities.See Willinsky (2006, chapter 4) for further discussion of this topic.
41It is a puzzle why more journals do not charge a modest non-refundable submission fee. This would
help cover the cost of refereeing, and more importantly discourage speculative submissions which stand
little chance of eventual success and which apparently are so costly.
42See blog.wellcome.ac.uk/2014/03/28/the-cost-of-open-access-publishing-a-progress-report, accessed 31
March 2014, for details.
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published articles are freely available, a publisher need not go to the trouble of checking
that authors are complying with their copyright agreements.
While developments in information technology mean that a publishers costs have fallen
and its ability to extract surplus from readers has risen, as we discussed earlier this tech-
nology also allows authors to bypass a journals distribution function. Self-archiving may
cannibalise a publishers revenues from selling subscriptions to readers, and the e¤ect will
be greater if more authors do this and if the version they self-archive is a close substitute
for the published version. We will see in the next section that few authors seem voluntarily
to self-archive, and so the impact on subscriptions is likely to be signicant only when self-
archiving is mandated. However, since commercial publishers are currently so protable,
a good deal of cannibalisation can occur without causing them nancial distress.
3 The Evolution of Open Access
A full account of how access to scholarly knowledge has widened over time would include
the invention of the printing press, the adoption of vernacular language (rather than Latin,
say) by scholars, the birth of scientic journals in the seventeenth century to document new
discoveries, the introduction of public libraries and free museums, and the advent of radio
and television.43 For our purposes, it is convenient to start in the 1990s when researchers
rst used the internet to distribute their work on a large scale.44
In 1991, the physicist Paul Ginsparg launched arXiv, a subject-based online repository
for physics, and later for mathematics, computer science and statistics. This currently hosts
nearly a million papers and has around six million article downloads per month. Three
years later was cognitive scientist Stevan Harnads subversive proposal that scholars
should make their research freely available on the internet, writing: For centuries, it was
only out of reluctant necessity that authors of esoteric publications made the Faustian
bargain to allow a price-tag to be erected as a barrier between their work and its (tiny)
intended readership because that was the only way to make their work public in the era
when paper publication [was] the only way to do so(Harnad, 1995).
43See Willinsky (2006), especially chapter 13, for an account of these developments.
44A much more detailed timeline of developments in open access is provided by Peter Suber at
legacy.earlham.edu/~peters/fos/timeline.htm.
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Gold open access, in which journal articles themselves are freely available at the time of
publication, received a major boost with the launch in 2003 of the Public Library of Science
(PLOS) journal PLOS Biology, which was free to readers and which originally charged
$1,500 to authors. This journal has the highest impact factor in the biology subject area
in 2013 according to Thomson Reuters Citation Reports, belying suggestions sometimes
made that open access journals must be low quality. BioMed Central is a commercial open
access publisher (now a subsidiary of Springer) which started shortly before PLOS, and it
now has more than 250 full open access journals in the science and medicine area, with
author fees mostly in the range £ 1000 to £ 1500.
In 2004, Springer allowed authors of articles in its standard subscription journals to pay
$3,000 to make an article fully open access, thus starting a new kind of hybridjournal
in which some articles are free to authors but readers pay, and other articles have the
reverse price pattern. Similar options are now o¤ered by many journals, although it is by
no means universal.45 A number of prominent journals follow a model of delayed open
access, so that the published version becomes freely available after an embargo period.
The two most cited journals in the world in 200946, Journal of Biological Chemistry and
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, both follow this policy (with respective
embargoes of twelve months and six months).
A landmark for green open access was Elseviers decision in 2004 to permit its authors
to self-archive the accepted version of published papers (but not the publishers typeset
version) on her own website or home institutions repository without an embargo period.
(Depositing the accepted version in a centralised subject repository was generally not
permitted.) A representative from BioMed Central, which follows the rival gold route,
claimed that this kind of archiving is in many ways useless to the majority of scientists,
mainly because no one will know the copies exist at all or where to nd them.However,
Stevan Harnad was much warmer, writing there will be the predictable cavils form the
pedants [...]. I, for one, am prepared to stoutly defend Elsevier on all these counts, and
to say that one could not have asked for more, and that the full benets of open access
45For instance, at the time of writing none of the top 5 economics journals (American Economic
Review, Econometrica, Journal of Political Economy, Quarterly Journal of Economics and the Review of
Economic Studies) o¤er this option.
46See archive.sciencewatch.com/dr/sci/09/aug2-09_2.
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require not one bit more - from the publisher.47
While it is one thing for publishers to permit immediate self-archiving, it is quite another
for authors voluntarily to do so. Self-archiving involves a modest cost of time and e¤ort to
the author (especially the rst time it is done), and if an author believes that her article is
disseminated to her desired audience by the journal anyway, it may not be in her interest
to self-archive. (Authors have more incentive to self-archive their pre-submitted version,
so that their paper becomes known early on.) The model in section 5.1 has the feature
that no author self-archives voluntarily.48
In the United States, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) is the principal public
funder of research in the biomedicine area, and its policies toward research dissemination
have played a large role in the open access debate. In 2005, after consultation (and lobby-
ing) in 2004, the NIH announced its new Policy on Enhancing Public Access to Archived
Publications Resulting from NIH-Funded Research, which stated NIH-funded investigators
are requested to submit an electronic version of the authors nal manuscript [...] as soon
as possible (and within twelve months of the publishers o¢ cial date of nal publication).
The relatively lengthy embargo period and the fact that authors were only requested
meant the policy had relatively little bite, and levels of compliance were low. In 2008, the
NIH tightened its policy so that grant-holders were required to self-archive their published
research (again, with a twelve month embargo), and compliance substantially increased.49
Many other research funders follow variants of this approach now, although often with a
six rather than twelve month embargo period. Note that to monitor author compliance, it
47Both this and the previous quote were reported in an article titled Reed allows academics free web
accessin The Guardian on 3 June 2004. Somewhat sourly, House of Commons (2004, pp. 57-8) suggested
that We are in little doubt that Elsevier timed the announcement of its new policy on self-archiving to
pre-empt the publication of this Report.
48The propensity for authors to self-archive varies considerably across subject areas. Bergstrom and
Lavaty (2007) investigate a number of economics journals to discover the proportion of published papers
which were freely available online in some form. They nd that the proportion tends to fall o¤ for less
prestigious journals, but for the top 15 journals about 90% of articles were available as working paper
versions (though not necessarily the accepted version). They nd less propensity to self-archive in political
science, where only 30% of published articles at that time were freely available. In the humanities, where
books are still an important form of scholarly writing, self-archiving is rarer and authors hardly ever post
a pre-published version of a book on the internet, in part because doing so would cannibalise their own
royalties.
49In Richard Poynders website Open and Shut (visited 24 March 2014), the entry titled Open access
mandates: ensuring compliancereports that in the voluntary era before 2008, compliance with the NIH
request to self-archive was only 19%, while in the compulsory era by 2012 the compliance rate was 75%.
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is useful to use a designated repository (or repositories), as it is hard to verify the history
of an authors personal webpage. (The NIH uses PubMed Central as its repository.)
Universities can also encourage their employees to self-archive. For example, since
2008 Harvard University has tried to ensure that its faculty deposit their work in the
universitys open access repository. However, the policy appears to be relatively weak,
since faculty are not strictly obliged to self-archive in the universitys repository, and there
are no consequences for failing to comply. As of 2011, half of the Harvards Faculty of Arts
and Sciences had deposited some document to the repository.50
In 2004, the UKs House of Commons Science and Technology Committee investigated
the market for scientic publications (House of Commons, 2004), and recommended fol-
lowing a green open access approach. Specically, they suggested (paragraph 115) that
universities be funded to establish institutional repositories, and wrote (paragraph 117)
that authors currently lack su¢ cient motivation to self-archive in institutional reposito-
ries. We recommend that the Research Councils and other Government funders mandate
their funded researchers to deposit of a copy of all their articles in their institutions repos-
itory within [...] a reasonable period to be agreed following publication, as a condition of
their research grant.The Government essentially refused to implement any of the main
recommendations in this report, and the committee clearly believed that consideration of
business interests had neutralised the careful analysis from the committee and other
government bodies.51 In retrospect, this was a missed opportunity, since the committees
recommendations were close to current policy in the UK.
In 2012, the UKs Finch group published its report on expanding access to journals,
which had been commissioned by government. This report, by contrast with the earlier
UK report and with most international policy, suggested following the gold route, and its
central recommendation was that a clear policy direction should be set towards support
for publication in open access or hybrid journals, funded by [author publication fees], as
the main vehicle for the publication of research, especially when it is publicly funded.
Moreover, the report was cautious when it came to any green policies, suggesting that
50See Brand (2012) for further details of the Harvard policy. See Suber (2012, chapter 4) for an overview
of various mandate policies used by funders and universities.
51See paragraph 7 of Responses to the Committees Tenth Report, Session 2003-04, Scientic Publica-
tions: Free for all?
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funderslimitations on the length of embargo periods [...] should be considered carefully, to
avoid undue risk to valuable journals that are not funded in the main by [author publication
charges]and that it would be unreasonable to require embargo periods of less than twelve
months.52 In contrast to the previous report in 2004, the Government agreed in 2012 to
implement this report.53
There followed a period of confusion in UK policy, with the Research Councils changing
their stated policy a number of times. A subsequent report, House of Commons (2013,
paras. 63, 70) was strongly critical of the Finch Report and its adoption by government,
writing that At a time when the budgets of [universities] are under great pressure, it is
unacceptable that the Government has issued, without public consultation, an open access
policy that will require considerable subsidy from research budgets in order to maintain
journal subscriptions and cover [author publication fees]. Signication public investment
has already been made in institutional repositories [...] and they could represent a more
cost-e¤ective and sustainable route to full open access, and We recommend that the
Government and [Research Councils] reconsider their preference for Gold open access.
At the time of writing, the policy of the UKs Research Councils is that a grant-funded
researcher must either follow the gold route, i.e., publish in a journal which allows imme-
diate free access to the published article, or a green route by publishing in a journal which
allows her to self-archive the accepted version of her paper no more than six months after
publication (twelve months for humanities and social science subjects).54 The Research
Councils expressed a preferencefor the former, although this preference does not appear
to a¤ect a researchers freedom to choose between the two routes. In addition, the Research
Councils will make its contribution towards author publication fees directly to universities
(researchers cannot claim for publication fees in the grant itself), who will then distribute
52See Finch et al. (2012, pp. 7, 8, 10).
53See the announcement gov.uk/government/news/government-to-open-up-publicly-funded-research.
54The justication for having longer embargoes for humanities and social science subjects is that articles
in these subjects often have longer half-lives than articles in many science subjects, and hence that
readers wish to consult these journals for longer. For instance, Thomson Reuters Citations Reports show
that subjects such as history, law or economics have citation half-lives (that is, the median age of a
cited article in the reference year) of more than 10 years, while many medical subject areas (such as
endocrinology, oncology, geriatrics) have half-lives in the 6-7 year range. A journal with a long half-life
will plausibly be commercially hurt more by a green policy with a given embargo period than a journal
with a shorter half-life.
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these funds to researchers as they see t.55 There is also a clause stating that if funds for
publication fees are not availableto the author, the author can self-archive with longer
embargo periods (12 months, or 24 months for humanities and social science).56
Finally, open access will be required for the next research excellence frameworkin the
UK, which covers all important journal publications in the country published after 2016.
Similarly to the Research Councilspolicy, for a journal publication to be submitted for the
next review, the article must either appear without embargo from the publisher itself, or
the authors accepted version must be available from a suitable repository no longer than
12 months after publication (24 months for humanities and social sciences).57 In essence,
this will make the great majority of the UKs journal publications open access in some
form, albeit with potentially a lengthy delay in many subjects.
4 Conclusions
The rst denition of to publish in the Oxford English Dictionary is to make public.
However, an unregulated journal market o¤ers limited access to the wider public, along-
side high subscription charges for research institutions, free service for most authors and
high prots for publishers. The reason for this skewed pattern of prices is that each peer-
reviewed article makes a unique contribution, and readers must pay whatever the journal
asks to obtain access to this contribution. Since authors care somewhat about the read-
55My university will receive £ 1.1 million from the Research Councils for the year 2013/14 to deliver the
Councilspolicy on open access. The university plans to devote 80% of this to support publication fees,
which it suggests will cover one-third to one-half of the relevant publications. It will prioritise applications
for these funds from authors who wish to publish in a fully open access (not hybrid) journal or wish to
publish in a hybrid journal which has an embargo period for self-archiving beyond the Councilsstated
limits. That is, low priority will be given to authors wishing to pay for open access in a subscription
journal when that journal permits adequate self-archiving. See openaccess.ox.ac.uk/applying-for-funding-
from-oxfords-rcuk-open-access-block-grant (accessed 26 March 2014) for details.
56See www.rcuk.ac.uk/research/outputs (accessed 25 March 2014) for details. It is not clear how the
availabilityof funds for author fees will be judged. This is a crucial point, since many journals could not
be used with the tighter (six-to-twelve month) embargo. For example, at the time of writing the Quarterly
Journal of Economics does not o¤er a gold option and only permits self-archiving of the accepted version
after 24 months. Thus, under the strict version of the Research Councils rules, a grant-funded author
would not be permitted to publish in this journal at all. The Economic Journal makes an article open
access for an author fee of £ 1500, and again permits self-archiving of the accepted version only after 24
months. Thus, under the strict rules, a grant-funded author would for forced to follow the gold route if
they wished to published in this journal.
57See hefce.ac.uk/pubs/year/2014/201407/#d.en.86771, accessed 31 March 2014, for further details.
22
ership for their work, a publisher may not precisely maximize revenue from readers, but
temper its prices to ensure the journal is seen by the people the author wants. Neverthe-
less, most authors do not care enough about being read by the wider public to make it
worthwhile for journals to reach that far. The revenue from selling content to institutions
makes a publisher keen to attract authors, who usually pay nothing to publish.
This outcome has two main drawbacks: library budgets are siphoned o¤ by commercial
publishers, and the wider public and smaller institutions are excluded from research nd-
ings. These problems would be mitigated if many authors voluntarily self-archived their
papers, by posting the accepted version on their webpage or in a repository. However, the
evidence is that many authors do not go to the trouble to do this, especially if their article
is anyway being distributed to their desired audience by a journal.
These twin drawbacks are plausibly large enough to make some form of policy inter-
vention worthwhile, costly though that is in itself.58 Several forms of intervention can
be imagined. For instance, copyright on journal articles could be abolished, as suggested
by Shavell (2010). Alternatively, there could be some kind of price cap on subscription
charges (di¤erent from zero, which is the price cap for gold open access), publisher prots
above a certain level could have a special high tax rate with the proceeds fed back into the
university system, or libraries could form large consortiaand use their resulting buyer
power to mitigate the monopoly power of publishers.
However, the two main kinds of intervention currently under consideration are the
green and gold routes to open access. Green open access (as well as delayed open
access) ensures that an inferior version of the published article is made freely available
to all readers, while a gold regime makes the published version freely and immediately
available. If the inferior version is not too close a substitute to the premium published
version for instance, if the relevant embargo period is not too short keen readers will
still be willing to pay enough to cover the journals costs and most authors will still publish
for free. An open access policy can be implemented with some form of mandate on authors
to make their work available in the stipulated manner. This mandate might come from the
58Suber (2012, pp. 133-4) discusses some cost-benet studies of the impact of open access, which claim
to nd signicant gains in a move to open access.
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researchers grant funder, from her university, or at the national level.59 A funding body
can reasonably implement a more stringent policy than, say, a nationwide policy, since a
researchers decision to apply to a particular funder is voluntary, while a strict national
policy would unduly restrict a researchers publishing options.
There are a number of downsides to the green policy, relative to not intervening at all.
While not expensive, operating a repository for self-archiving involves some outlay,60 and
it is costly for a regulator to monitor compliance with a self-archiving mandate. Mandated
self-archiving imposes some limited costs of e¤ort on authors, and if only a subset of journals
comply with the requirements a mandate restricts an authors options to publish. The hope
is and much past experience suggests that most journals will adapt to a new regime by
allowing authors to self-archive the accepted version within the stipulated period.61 But
if the body making policy is small relative to the world market, an international journal
may not nd it worthwhile to change its policy. It is possible, though not inevitable, that
a green policy will result in fewer people reading the publishers version than before. This
could mean that readers do not always know which journal published a paper, and hence do
not see the quality signal the journal imparts. However, discovering the paper via Google
scholar almost always reveals the host journal, and so the loss to readers may not be great.
If a green (or delayed) open access policy has any bite, prots will be a¤ected and we
would expect publishers to lobby against the policy (as has already been seen). But from a
broader perspective, this is not really a downside as one aim of policy should be to transfer
surplus from publishers to research institutions. The model in section 5.1 suggests that free
version should be a close enough substitute to the published version that all super-normal
prots are eliminated. In practice, this outcome is hard to achieve since there is currently
59The grant funder potentially has a powerful hold on the author, if its nal money is not paid out until
there is compliance (or if publishing timescales do not permit this, further grants would not be awarded to
an author who had failed to comply in the past). Likewise, a nationwide policy can be a powerful driver
of compliance. In the UK, essentially all active researchers can be made to comply if the publications
submitted for the research excellence frameworkare required to be open access in the stipulated way.
60It currently costs about $800,000 per year to run the arXiv repository, and revenue for this comes
partly from large donations from Cornell University and the Simons Foundation, and partly from smaller
donations from a large number of member institutions. See arxiv.org for more information.
61A journal might make exceptions to its prevailing copyright policy, for instance by allowing papers
funded from a particular source to be self-archived more quickly than its other papers. For example, the
Review of Economic Studies currently has an embargo period of 24 months for self-archiving, which is
reduced to 12 months if the paper has received nancial support from a funding body.
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only limited empirical data about how subscription revenues are cannibalised with various
kinds of self-archiving and delayed open access.62 However, if policy initially gets it wrong,
the journal can make up any revenue shortfall by means of author charges rather than
actually going bankrupt.63
Scholarly associations often benet directly from high journal subscription charges, and
also actively lobby against open access regulations. However, a principle of competition
policy is that exploitative conduct cannot be justied by the use subsequently made of
monopoly prots, however benign. In any case, if the activities of the association (such as
conferences or scholarships) are valuable, it should be able to obtain funds more directly
from funding bodies. It would be a pity if the special interests of associations were an
impediment to widening access to research.
A gold policy brings greater benets, but also greater potential drawbacks. It is surely
of some benet to the reader to read the publishers version: the format may be somewhat
more attractive, the reader has peace of mind knowing she has the nal version, and she
automatically knows which journal published the paper. As mentioned in section 2.2, a
subscription price which is precisely zero (rather than merely cheap) will reduce several
costs of a journal. Relatedly, it is far easier for regulators to ensure that authors are
complying with their open access obligations relative to a green regime.
Set against these benets, though, are potential problems caused by authors having to
pay to publish. First, there are sound public nance reasons why readers should contribute
something to the cost of publishing. Taking a parochial perspective, most readers of journal
articles written by authors in a small country will be overseas, and it is not obvious that
national taxes should be used to fund free access for these readers. In addition, many
readers of scientic research are in the industrial and corporate sector, and it is unclear
why all such readers should free ride on a subsidised author-pays regime.64
62Finch et al. (2012, para. 7.67) mentions a survey of librarians asked for their response if journal
content became freely available after a six month embargo period. Apparently 10% would then cancel
all subscriptions to science, technology and medicine journals and 23% would cancel all subscriptions to
humanities and social science journals.
63For instance, the journal Microbiology of the Cell currently has an extremely short embargo period
of two months before its own content is made freely available, and author versions are immediately freely
available on its website. The journal supplements its subscription revenue by charging authors as well.
64House of Commons (2004, paragraph 175) reports that Elsevier obtains 20% of its journal revenue
from this sector, and quotes the Biochemical Society as saying in the open-access world it would appear
25
If an author-pays policy is not to have a major impact on the supply of published ar-
ticles, many authors will need to have their publication fees paid by others. (Recall that
the average publication charge for open access paid by the Wellcome Trust in 2012/13
was around £ 1800.) The details for how to administer these fee subsidies are di¢ cult to
formulate, and, in the UK at least, it is far from clear how well current arrangements will
work. If authors have publication fees paid automatically, there is a danger of moral haz-
ard, and authors will choose to publish in expensive, high production-standards journals
will little regard for the extra cost in doing so. Perhaps more likely, though, is that many
authors will incur a personal cost in publishing a paper, either directly out of their own
pocket or in terms of having to use research funds which they value for other purposes.
Indeed, there is a danger of additional inequities being introduced in the academic world,
with established authors with research funds at wealthy institutions having no problem
funding expensive publications, while others must place their work in cheaper outlets.
A claim is often made that an author-pays regime gives rise to a conict of interest
for journals, since they make money every time they accept a paper, and this will drive
down standards.65 This argument often reects special pleading by traditional subscription
journals, who in any case also make more money (from their readers) when they publish
more articles. Perhaps a better way to think about this issue is that the demand for journal
certication by authors may fall when authors pay to publish (as illustrated in the model
in section 5.2). In a traditional subscription-funded market, authors of good papers can
publish at lower cost (or at least no higher cost) than authors with mediocre papers, and so
an author has a clear incentive to place her article in the most discriminating journal willing
to accept it. The result is that potential readers obtain a relatively precise signal of quality
from the journal in which a paper appears. In an author-pays regime, it becomes more
expensive to publish a paper in a discriminating journal since peer-review costs are higher.
As result, some authors with good papers particularly younger researchers with less access
to research funds or researchers in poorer countries may not be able to a¤ord the extra
that the only real winners are going to be corporate pharmaceutical companies who would no longer have
to pay to access information.
65In House of Commons (2004, page 80), Harold Varmus, one of the founders of PLOS, said this argument
was rubbish [...]. We have reviewers who make the determinations about what we are going to accept,
who have no direct interest in the fate of our journal, but the most important thing is that we [...] want
our journals to be high quality. It is the only way we are going to succeed.
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expense, and choose to submit to a less prestigious journal alongside mediocre papers.66
As a result, readers have a less precise signal of quality than before, and good papers may
be lost amongst the mediocre. Nevertheless, it is possible though not inevitable that
the certication role of journals may be diminishing over time, as potential readers gain
easy access to other cues of a papers quality (such as citations and downloads).
In sum, there are arguments to support of both the green and gold routes to open
access. My own view, though, is that for the present a green (or delayed open access)
policy which makes a high proportion of research available to the public delivers most
of the benets of full open access, without the signicant disruption involved in moving
to a high-fee author-pays regime. This is especially the case in a smaller country acting
alone. A small countrys policy can make little di¤erence to the level of subscriptions its
libraries must pay, and the primary impact of an open access policy is to better publicise
the countrys research around the world.
In the longer term, though, there is the possibility that a journals role in certifying
and improving papers, and the costs they thereby incur, diminishes over time. More
journals may adopt editorial policies which focus more on ensuring a paper is correct
and does not duplicate existing work. Such policies would eliminate much ine¢ ciency and
delay in current review procedures. Since less time is spent on writing referee reports and
preparing revisions, this would enable authors to devote more of their time to research.
And since this research would appear in its nal form more quickly, readers would also
benet. The impact of a paper could be gauged more by its citations, downloads and other
measures than the name of the journal, and these metrics will come to matter more for an
authors reputation and as guides to important work for readers. The current low costs for
typesetting articles and administering the submission process, together with the reduced
cost of a light-touchreview process, may mean that publication charges in a gold regime
will be easily a¤ordable to the great majority of authors.
66For instance, within the PLOS group of open access journals, the highly selective PLOS Biology
charges authors $2900, while the less selective PLOS ONE charges $1350. It could be that all the good
biology papers are published in the former journal; however, it is more plausible that some good papers
are published in the latter due to nancial constraints of some authors.
27
5 Appendix: Models of Journal Publishing
5.1 A model of journal distribution
The model presented here illustrates three issues: why the traditional reader-paysbusi-
ness model is the equilibrium outcome in an unregulated journal market; why the reader-
paysmodel leads to prices which might greatly exceed associated costs and to super-
normal publishing prots, even in an unconcentrated journal market, and why regulatory
intervention to achieve open access can help to overcome the monopoly problem and the
public access problem.
There are an unlimited number of identical journals which publish papers submitted
by authors and distribute them to readers. Each journal incurs a cost f for reviewing and
typesetting each article, but there is no cost for distributing an article to readers. The peer-
review process ensures that a published article is strongly di¤erentiated from every other
article, and so a readers willingness-to-pay for one article does not depend on whether the
reader has access to other articles. We assume that a reader values each article equally,
and a type-v reader is willing to pay up to v for each article they read.67 (In the next
model we discuss a scenario where articles have di¤ering quality.) There are two kinds of
reader: libraries, of which there are n in number and which are each prepared to pay up
to vH for any published article, and the wider public, who are m in number and who are
each prepared to pay vL per published article.68 We suppose that information or arbitrage
constraints mean that a publisher must charge all readers the same price.69
A number of authors each have a paper. Authors care that their article reaches the
libraries. For instance, an author cares that fellow researchers can read her article, and
researchers have access to journals via their libraries. However, we assume authors gain
67The simplifying assumption that a reader has the same willingness-to-pay for every article implies there
is no incentive for publishers to bundle articles or journals. Relatedly, it implies we can consider policy
towards each article separately. For example, open access policy might apply only to particular articles
(those which are publicly funded, say), while other articles might be distributed using the traditional
reader-pays business model.
68Note that libraries do not have exogenous budget constraintsin this model. See Jeon and Menicucci
(2006) for a model of the journal market where libraries cannot a¤ord to subscribe to all the journals they
would like to.
69If a publisher could set di¤erent prices to the two kinds of reader, rst degree price discrimination
would be possible, and all readers would be served (although all their surplus would be extracted).
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no further benet from reaching the wider public. Given that journals are available in
libraries, authors view journals as perfect substitutes as vehicles to disseminate their work
and will choose the journal with the lowest publication fee. For exogenous reasons, we
suppose that a journal cannot pay an author when it publishes her article, and it charges
the publication fee p  0 to its authors. If authors have to pay p to publish their paper
in equilibrium, suppose that N(p) authors will choose to publish. In general, N() is a
decreasing function, reecting that authors may have heterogeneous access to funds or
obtain di¤erent benets from publishing. Suppose that V (p) is the associated net surplus
of authors when the publication fee is p, which satises V 0(p)   N(p).
An author can bypass the dissemination function of journals by self-archiving a version
of their paper. However, suppose that authors incur a small private cost when self-archiving
their work, and so will not voluntarily do so if their journal is available in libraries and
they can publish for free.
Suppose that
nvH > (n+m)vL ; (1)
which ensures that a journal obtains more revenue from selling only to libraries than it
does from selling to all readers. Suppose also that
nvH > f ; (2)
so that the revenue from selling to libraries covers the cost of running a journal.
The unique equilibrium in an unregulated market is easily derived. Given assumption
(1), a journal makes the most revenue from readers by selling only to libraries. Moreover,
an author obtains no benet from reaching the wider public, nor does she care intrinsically
about the price a library pays, and so a journal obtains no competitive advantage from
o¤ering to supply the wider public or from o¤ering to set a low price to libraries. We
deduce that each journal will choose a subscription charge P = vH to extract all library
surplus. Since each article then generates prot nvH   f , a journal has a strong incentive
to attract authors. Since an author will choose the journal with the lowest publication fee,
it is clear that the only equilibrium publication fee is zero. (If not, then a publisher has
an incentive to undercut the prevailing positive fee a little, and attract all authors.)
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The outcome in the unregulated market favours authors at the expense of readers:
authors can publish for free, while readers either have all surplus extracted or are not
served at all. Journals make prot nvH   f > 0 per article published.70 Suppose that
publisher prot is worth nothing in the welfare calculation, and we are only interested in
the sum of author and reader surplus. In this case, welfare in this unregulated market is
W1 = V (0) ; (3)
since readers obtain no surplus in equilibrium.
Note that an open access journal cannot succeed in this unregulated market. If it does
not charge readers, it must cover its costs by charging authors instead, and no author would
prefer to pay a positive price instead of publishing for free.71 A journal would not wish its
authors to self-archive their paper since that would reduce a librarys willingness-to-pay
for access (see below). But since authors incur a small cost to self-archive and enjoy no
extra benet from doing so, there is no need for a journal to prohibit self-archiving.
Consider a partialopen access regime in which an inferior version of the published
paper is required to be made available, either by the publisher in the form of delayed open
access, or by the author who self-archives her own version of the article. (In the latter
case, since we assumed there is a small cost involved in self-archiving, authors need to be
mandated to do this.) If a reader has valuation v for the published version of a paper,
suppose that this reader has valuation v for reading the inferior version instead, where
 < 1 is the same for all readers and represents the substitutability of the two versions.72 If
the reader charge is P , a reader with valuation v will pay for the published version rather
than read the free version if v   P  v, i.e., if P  (1   )v. Under the same condition
70If there were not the exogenous constraint that authors cannot be paid when they publish, the equi-
librium would instead be that publisher prots are passed back to authors, who are paid nvH   f for their
article. The outcome for readers is unchanged. In the model presented, the equilibrium appears to be
somewhat knife-edge, in that authors are precisely indi¤erent between all journals, and if a journal could
somehow slightly improve its o¤er to authors it could attract much protable business. (For instance, a
journal might compete on its turnaround time, or attractive layout, or by giving a mug to an author.) This
drawback could be overcome in a slightly extended model where authors viewed journals as being slightly
di¤erentiated, say. The fact remains that many commercial publishers are highly protable, suggesting
that there is some barrier to prot dissipation in this market.
71If some authors did intrinsically care su¢ ciently about reaching the wider public, some journals would
voluntarily set a low enough reader price to induce all readers to subscribe.
72As discussed in section 2.1, it may on occasion be that the refereeing process actually makes a paper
worse. In such cases, we would have  > 1:
30
(1), a journal prefers to sell only to libraries, but its subscription charge can now be no
higher than (1   )vH . The parameter  captures the extent to which the free version
cannibalises a journals revenue from libraries.
If  is small enough so that
n(1  )vH  f ; (4)
then this reduced revenue from libraries is still su¢ cient to cover the journals cost. The
equilibrium with this form of regulation is that authors are again charged nothing to
publish, libraries pay the reduced price (1 )vH to have access to the premium published
version, while the wider public can access the inferior version for free. Putting this together
implies that total welfare in this regime is73
W2 = V (0) +N(0)[nvH +mvL] (5)
Thus, since the extra term in (5) is positive, a requirement to make an inferior version freely
available boosts total welfare in this model. The gain comes from two sources. First, the
wider public is able to read the inferior version, while before they were excluded altogether.
Second, libraries are charged (1   )vH to access the published version, and so a library
has net surplus vH in this regime. The policy has no signicant impact on authors, who
can publish for free and reach their desired audience in any case. In sum, this partial open
access policy both expands readership and transfers a fraction  of prots from publishers
to libraries.
Consider next the goldopen access regime, when journals must o¤er readers access
to their published articles for free. Here, the equilibrium involves authors paying the cost
of the journal, so that p = f , and journals obtain no prot. We suppose that journals are
needed for certication and reputation, in the sense that an author will have no readers
and/or obtain no reputational benet if she merely self-archives her paper without also
publishing in a journal. The welfare of readers and authors is now
W3 = V (f) +N(f)[nvH +mvL] : (6)
The impact of the policy is that all readers have free access to published research, publisher
prots are eradicated, but the number of published articles may fall. If the supply of articles
73We suppose that with a green policy, the authors cost of self-archiving is small enough that it can be
ignored when calculating welfare.
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is inelastic, so that N(f)  N(0), then V (f)  V (0) N(0)f , and (6) implies
W3  V (0) +N(0) [nvH +mvL   f ] :
Given (4), welfare with the gold policy is then higher than in both the unregulated market
(3) and the green regime (5). Publisher prots obtained in the unregulated market are
fully transferred to the academic sector of authors and libraries (although within this sector
there is a transfer from authors to libraries), and the wider public have free access to the
published version of research.
However, this welfare ranking is changed if the supply of articles is su¢ ciently elastic.
Since authors are worse-o¤ in the gold regime relative to the partial regime, a su¢ cient
condition for welfare to be lower in the gold regime than the partial regime is that readers
are worse o¤. However, readers are worse o¤ in the gold regime if and only if
N(f)[nvH +mvL] < N(0)[nvH +mvL] ;
i.e., if the quality adjustednumber of published articles is higher in the partial regime
so that N(f)=N(0) < . This condition is satised if the supply of articles contracts
su¢ ciently when author fees are introduced.
In practice, in a partial open access regime, the policy-maker can choose how inferior
the free version is, so that  is endogenous. For example, the length of embargo period
determines how close a substitute the free version is to the published paper. As  varies
from 0 to 1, the partial policy nests the unregulated market ( = 0) and the gold policy
( = 1) as polar cases. This analysis shows that policy should at least choose  high enough
that (4) just binds and authors can continue to publish for free. So long as there is no
impact on the supply of published articles, welfare is improved when the wider public can
enjoy a better version of the research and when more prot is transferred to libraries. It is
possible that welfare can be improved further by choosing  even higher, so that authors
are required to contribute to journal costs, but that calculation requires a more delicate
analysis of the elasticity of supply of articles.
5.2 A model of quality certication
The previous model focussed on the dissemination task performed by journals. Another
important task is to certify the quality of papers they publish. Journals have earned a
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reputation for being selective, and the fact that a paper is published in a particular journal
is informative about its likely quality. As discussed in section 2.1, ex ante information
about an articles quality is valuable to readers because that helps them better target
their reading e¤orts. Likewise, certication is valuable to authors of good papers, as being
published in a discriminating journal enhances this authors reputation among those who
do not already know the authors work directly and also makes people more likely to read
their paper.
The model presented here illustrates how a gold open access policy might adversely
e¤ect the equilibrium amount of certication performed in the market. Suppose that there
are two kinds of article, goodones with quality qH and mediocreones with quality qL.
An author knows the quality of her article ex ante, but has no control over whether her
article is good or mediocre.
By incurring cost c > 0, which might be interpreted as the cost of a peer review process,
a journal can accurately determine an articles quality. A journal can be one of two types:
a discriminating journal publishes only good articles and incurs the evaluation cost c
per submission and cost f per publication, while a non-discriminatingjournal publishes
any article submitted, and so incurs only the cost f per publication. Readers and authors
are assumed to be able to observe which journals are discriminating and which are not,
perhaps because they have consulted journals in the past or because they know a journals
impact factor or similar. We assume that an author of a mediocre paper will not submit
to a discriminating journal, so that a discriminating journals cost per article published
is f + c. (This can be ensured by supposing that a discriminating journal charges a non-
refundable submission fee in addition to a publication fee. Since authors know the quality
of their paper they will then only submit if they have a good paper.) There is an unlimited
supply of both types of journal.
Suppose that an author obtains reputational benet b(q) if she publishes an article
which is perceived to have (average) quality q, and authors do not care directly about
the readership of their article.74 Suppose that a journal can extract revenue r(q) from
74This simple framework abstracts away from the likelihood that an author of a good paper will gain
reputational benets from being read, in addition to being able to put a good publication on her CV,
since those who read the paper will discover that the paper is indeed good, even if it appears in a non-
discriminating journal.
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the population of readers for an article with perceived average quality q. Naturally, both
b() and r() increase with q. All articles published in a discriminating journal are known
to have quality qH , while an article in a non-discriminating journal has expected quality
which depends on the proportion of good and mediocre articles submitted in the relevant
equilibrium. We focus on the case where
r(qH)  f + c ; (7)
so that an article known to be good generates su¢ cient revenue from readers to cover its
cost of publication and peer review.
The equilibrium outcome in an unregulated market is for all good papers to appear in
discriminating journals. Given assumption (7), competition for authors with good papers
by discriminating journals implies that the author fee is driven down to zero and such an
author obtains payo¤ b(qH). Such an author could instead choose to publish in a non-
discriminating journal. In this candidate equilibrium, readers believe that a paper in a
non-discriminating journal is surely mediocre, and so publishing in a non-discriminating
journal yields the author reputational benet b(qL). As a result, the payo¤ to the author is
at most b(qL) since she may also have to pay a publication fee. Therefore, in this candidate
equilibrium the author of a good paper has no incentive to deviate and to publish in a non-
discriminating journal. (The author of a mediocre article cannot publish in a discriminating
journal since her article will be rejected, and that deviation need not be considered.) It
is thus an equilibrium for all good papers to appear in discriminating journals. A related
argument shows there can be no equilibrium in which some good papers appear in non-
discriminating journals, and so this is the unique equilibrium.
What happens to authors of mediocre papers in this equilibrium depends on how much
revenue such a paper generates. If r(qL)  f , then even a mediocre article generates
reader revenue su¢ cient to cover a non-discriminating journals cost. In this case, all
authors can publish for free. However, if r(qL) < f , then authors of mediocre papers will
have to contribute to the cost of publication, and in equilibrium they are each charged
p = f   r(qL). In the extreme case where an article known to be mediocre goes entirely
unread, so that r(qL) = 0, these authors must cover the full cost of publishing. A non-
discriminating journal can then style itself as open accesswithout losing reader revenue.
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In an unregulated market, the equilibrium then involves good articles being published in
discriminating reader-pays journals for free, while authors of mediocre articles engage in
vanitypublishing and pay for their work to appear in non-discriminating open access
journals. (In section 2.1 we discussed how something similar to this can be seen currently
in the journal market.)
As in section 5.1, suppose that a partial open access policy requires an inferior version
of the published paper to be made freely available, where this inferior version is viewed
by a reader who values the published article at v as having value v. (In particular, in
the case of a green policy where the author makes her own version of the published paper
available, we assume that a reader who is considering whether to read the self-archived
paper knows the journal in which it is published, either by checking directly or because
the author is required to state the journal when she self-archives.) As a result, the revenue
function is shifted down from r(q) to (1 )r(q). In this case, a similar equilibrium to that
in the unregulated market is seen, provided that  is small enough that
(1  )r(qH)  f + c ;
so that a discriminating journal can cover its costs without charging authors. In particular,
all good papers appear in discriminating journals, and potential readers have an accurate
signal of quality from the journal in which the article appears. Provided that it allows
discriminating journals to cover their costs from subscriptions alone, a partial policy has no
adverse impact on the certicationservices provided in the market. As before, the policy
enables all potential readers to access the research and transfers prot from publishers to
those readers who choose to pay for the published version.
With gold open access regulation, an author bears the cost of publishing. Competition
between journals implies that the author publication fee at a discriminating journal is f+c,
while at a non-discriminating journal the fee is f .75 Thus, a crucial di¤erence between a
reader-pays and an author-pays regime is that in the former case publication fees tend to
be lower at discriminating journals, while the latter has the opposite pattern.
75There indeed appears to be an imperfect correlation between the qualityof an open access journal
and its publication charge. See the discussion of the PLOS collection of open access journals in section 4,
as well as Solomon and Björk (2012b, Figure 5).
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With the gold policy, an author with a good paper will choose to publish in a discrimi-
nating journal only if the additional reputational benet of publishing in a discriminating
outlet outweighs the disutility of paying the extra publication fee. Such an author may
choose to publish in a non-discriminating journal if her marginal utility of research (or
private) funds is su¢ ciently high.76 Since now some good articles are published in non-
discriminating journals, readers have a less precise signal about articles quality than they
did in the unregulated market. For instance, if mediocre articles are worthless, no one
would ever read a non-discriminating journal in the unregulated market. In the gold open
access regime, though, a reader will either have to sift through these journals to nd the
fraction of good papers they contain, or ignore these journals altogether, which means the
good articles in them go unnoticed.
Example: To make this analysis a little more concrete, consider the following special
case. Suppose that all readers are identical and each article is an experience good, in the
sense that a reader does not know its quality until she has invested e¤ort in reading it.
Specically, suppose that a reader incurs a private reading cost s > 0 for reading any
paper, in addition to the payment P required by the journal. If an article has expected
quality q and access price P , suppose that a reader is willing to read the article if and only
if q  s+P . Thus, if there are N readers, the revenue function is r(q) = N(q  s) if q  s.
If q < s, then no one will read the article even if it is free. Provided that condition (7)
holds, in the unregulated market, when qL < s < qH no one will read a non-discriminating
journal, while discriminating journals will charge P = qH   s for access.77 In a gold
open access regime, suppose that the equilibrium proportion of mediocre articles in a non-
discrirminating journal is , so that average quality in such a journal is q = qL+(1 )qH .
If  is large enough that q < s, then no one will consult a non-discriminating journal and so
miss out on the good articles they contain. If q > s then a reader will read these journals,
but incur a loss s  qL for each mediocre article they have to read in the process.
This model assumes that the journals name is the only signal of quality available to
76Alternatively, di¤erent authors may place di¤erent weight on reputation, so that the function b(q) may
be less steep for some authors, who then are not prepared to pay the extra for a better reputation.
77If qH < s then a reader will not read even a known good paper, while if qL > s a reader will read
even a known mediocre paper. In either case, having ex ante information about an articles quality is not
useful to readers.
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readers. As discussed in section 2.1, though, nowadays readers have additional cues for
quality, including the number of citations or downloads an article receives. As a result,
the certication function of journals may be less important, and the danger of moving to
the gold regime in this regard may not be so severe. Nevertheless, early readers have only
the journal name to use as a signal. If non-discriminating journals are not read by early
readers since they do not contain a su¢ cient proportion of good articles, good articles in
these journals do not pick up citations and downloads, and so go unread by later readers
as well. In this situation, the journals reputation for selectivity continues to play an
important role in determining a papers eventual impact.
5.3 Related theoretical literature
The perspective of the publishing market taken in the model presented in section 5.1 is
that it is a competitive bottleneck(Armstrong, (2002, section 3.1) and Armstrong (2006,
section 5)). In particular, there is a close connection between this view of the publishing
market and call termination on telephone networks as discussed in Armstrong (2002,
section 3.1). There, people subscribe to a single telephone network (just as an author
publishes her article in one journal), and anyone who wishes to call a particular subscriber
has to pay whatever termination chargeis demanded by that subscribers network (just
as anyone who wishes to read a published article has to pay what that journal demands).
Telephone subscribers may care about the volume of calls they receive (just as authors
care about the size of their readership), which will induce their network to temper high
prices for call termination somewhat. Without regulation, revenues from call termination
in a competitive market are passed back to subscribers in the form of a subsidized or free
handset (just as prots from readers fund free publishing for authors). If the number of
subscribers is inelastic, however, it is optimal to regulate the price of call termination to be
equal to marginal cost (just as it is then optimal to have gold open access in the publishing
context). If the supply of subscribers is elastic it is optimal to set the price for termination
above cost, and use the resulting prots to fund better deals for subscribers (just as it may
be optimal to make readers contribute to the cost of journals when the supply of articles
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is elastic).78
Turning to related studies of the journal publishing market, Shavell (2010) presents a
model of the academic market which is similar to that in section 5.1. In particular, he
also focussed on the case where the journal market is competitive, and where potentially
high revenues from selling the journal to readers are passed onto authors in the form of a
subsidised charge for publishing. Shavell supposes that all authors write articles of equal
quality (that is, readers have the same demand function for each article) but di¤er in
how much they value readership. Authors who value having many readers will choose a
contract with a low reader price (and so relatively large publication fee), while authors who
care little for readers opt for a contract with a revenue-maximising reader price and are
paid for their work. In contrast to the model in section 5.1, Shavell does not impose the
constraint that authors cannot be paid to publish, and so his publishers make zero prots
in equilibrium.
McCabe and Snyder (2005) present a model of a monopoly prot-maximizing journal
that chooses which articles to publish and how much to charge the two sides of the inter-
action. (They assume that a paper is either goodor worthless, and authors do not
know the quality of their article at the time of submission.) They nd that the better the
journal is at picking out the good articles the higher is its charge to readers (and the lower
its charge to authors). They interpret this as implying that a less expert journal is more
likely to o¤er open access.
Jeon and Rochet (2010) also consider a market with a single journal, which chooses
the quality threshold for the papers it accepts. In their model, they nd that the socially
optimal way to price to the two sides is to have open access (see their Proposition 2). One
reason for this unambiguous result, however, is that they do not require the journal to
break even; if revenues from the two sides must cover the journals cost, it may be optimal
to charge readers for access so that authors are not unduly discouraged from publishing
by high publication fees. The rest of their paper mostly studies the case where the journal
aims to maximizes its readerswelfare. However, closer to the focus in the current paper,
78One major di¤erence between the two markets, however, is that any super-normal prots enjoyed by
telephone networks in an unregulated market can be siphoned o¤ when government auctions the rights to
use the spectrum needed to provide mobile telephony. In the publishing market, there is no such essential
resource which can be used to extract publisher prots.
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in their appendix they also study a for-prot monopoly journal. (The framework I study
in section 5.2 is quite similar to Jeon and Rochets model. Articles are either good or
bad where a badpaper has benet to the reader which is below her reading cost and
they assume that an author knows her quality in advance.) They nd that a reader-pays
journal will never accept bad papers, since that diminishes a readers willingness-to-pay for
the journal. However, in an author-pays regime the journal may accept a portion of bad
papers, as it cares less about pandering to reader interests. As a result, open access may
be associated with a fall in standards, just as the competitive market studied in section
5.2 exhibited a noisier signal of quality in an author-pays than a reader-pays regime.79
McCabe, Snyder and Fagin (2013) study a model with two authors and two readers.
One author cares about reaching readers (valuing each reader at a) while the other does
not; one reader has a value r from seeing any article, while the other does not and can be
reached only with open access. Suppose it costs f to process each paper and disseminate
it to any number of readers.80 When there is a single prot-maximizing journal, there are
ve strategies that the journal might follow: (i) publish one article and sell to one reader,
which yields prot a+ r  f ; (ii) publish one article but with open access to both readers,
which yields prot 2a f , (iii) publish two articles and sell both to one reader, which yields
prot 2r   2f , (iv) publish two articles with open access, which yields negative prot, or
(v) follow a hybridstrategy, and o¤er the author who does not care about readers free
publication to one paying reader, and o¤er the author who does care about readership open
access in return for a publication fee, which yields prot a+r 2f .81 Thus, the journal has
no incentive to follow the hybrid strategy, which is dominated by strategy (i).82 (However,
if policy forced the journal to o¤er some form of open access, the journal may prefer the
hybrid option to the full open access policy.)
79Jeon and Rochet do not investigate whether an author-pays or reader-pays regime (or a mixture of the
two) is observed in an unregulated monopoly market, but rather they derive the price to one side given
an exogenous constraint that the other side has free access.
80In fact, McCabe et al. suppose there is a constant cost of distributing the paper to each reader.
81Since the author who cares about readership could mimic the other author (who has access to a single
reader for free), the journal can only charge a publication fee of a to this author.
82In richer frameworks it would be optimal to o¤er a di¤erent readership to di¤erent authors, i.e.,
to follow a hybrid strategy. A general version of this situation would have authors di¤ering in their
demandfor readers and readers di¤ering in their demand for papers, and a monopoly journal solves a
two-sided screening problem in which the total volume of demands on the two sides must coincide. For a
model with this avour, see Gomes and Pavan (2014).
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